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Doubts about the reality of criminal offenders' autonomy 
have sometimes played a role in the movement to 
abolish, or greatly reduce the reach of, the sanction 
of capital punishment. 
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Although the Epilogue of "Freedom and 
Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound" speaks mainly 
fronz the perspective of the present, it carriesfonvard some of 
the historical themes addressed earlier in the article. The "Age 
of Pound" in the title refers to the first three decades of this 
century, the period during which Roscoe Pound, perhaps the 
most prominent legal academic of the Progressive Era, produced 
his most important writings on crinzinal justice in America. The 
111ain section of "Freedoni and Criminal Responsibility" traces 
Pound's attempt to come to terms with elements of the scientific 
positivism of his day, especially with his own acceptance of the 
criiique of the concept offvee will that the new sciences 
embodied. Pound remained optimistic that law and science 
lvould someday be brought together without sacrifice of the 
basic principles of either - savefor the "iwational"free will 
~.equirement for crinzinal responsibility. Due process, firm but 
benevolent trial management by a sociologically-infomied 
bench, and respect for thefttndamental human spirit (including 
tlze consciousness of humanfreedom) would characterizefuture 
crinzinal justice; how to reach that advanced stage of civilization 
Pound leftfor his successors to work out. 
Pound's optimism was not shared by all those who recognized 
the problenu that the new sciences posedfor tlze criminal law. 
The opening section of "Freedoni and Criminal responsibility" 
examines several essays written at the turn of the century by a 
little-known New York City lawyer named Gino Speranza 
Writing on tlie eve of the era that Pound came to dominate, 
Speranza launched a critique of the precedent-bound common- 
law generally and of the non-"scientific" criminal law in 
particular. But his enthusiasm for scientific positivism waned as 
he came to consider morefully its implicationsfor criminal 
responsibility. Jurisprudence, he argued, wasfdunded on the 
concept offree will and, mythic though it might be, that concept 
answered to deep human aspirations which science could not - 
and should not - displace. Speranza lookedforward to a 
"Great Pacificator" who would define the terms of 
rapprochement between law and science. He perhaps looked 
forward also to a principled rationalization of the inevitable 
bifurcation of criminal process - that is, the increasing 
distance between the trial, wherein the traditional presumption 
offvee will governed the ascription of criminal responsibility, 
and the sentencing process, which was coniing to bear the 
influence of the deterministic pranises of Progressive Era 
penology. Unlike Pound, who never gave up tlze hope that the 
domains of law and science would one day be unlfied, rather 
thanforever remain parallel, Speranza conceded, in 1901, that 
ultimately law was not a science. It was, and m w t  remain, "one 
of the humanities. " 
"Freedonz and Criminal Responsibility" is both a study of 
Pound and a lengthy commentary on the vicissitudes of 
criminal justice in late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
America. It relates Pound's perspective to those of several legal 
academics and behavioral scientists of the mid-to-late 1920s 
and it suggests that Pound's intellectual odyssey for-eshadows 
our own attempts to come to t e lnv  with tlie responsibility 
problenz. It suggests also that the history ofcrinzinal j~lstice can 
twt befully understood in isolatlonfi-om the history of these 
struggles which daily plague our conscious and subcorwio~ls lives. 
We well know how central the 
problem that Speranza addressed in 
1901 remains to our law - and, more 
generally, to our lives. For most of us, 
whether we are always or only occasionally 
conscious of it, the search for a 
"pacificator" goes on. Just as the bifur- 
cation of the legal process persists, so 
also does the division within our minds 
between the competing urges to explain 
causally and to affix blame, in the strong 
sense of criminal responsibility. From the 
Progressive Era forward, the rhetoric of 
the social and psychological causes of 
crime have vied - in the law, in the 
media, in ourselves - with the rhetoric 
of, and ineradicable belief in human 
heedom. This ceaseless battle is only 
partly contained by the view that, though 
determining factors exist, they are 
typically not all encompassing: that we 
- and those whom we blame - have 
the wherewithal to resist, even if we lack 
the ability to draw the line between the 
resistible and the irresistible. 
As has been the case for generations 
and perhaps centuries, we sometimes 
reflect these uncertainties in our 
tendency to soften the rigors of the 
sanctions to which we subject those 
whom we judge. Doubts about the reality 
of criminal offenders' autonomy have 
sometimes played a role in the movement 
to abolish, or greatly reduce the reach of, 
the sanction of capital punishment. 
Those to whom it seems equally 
irrational "merely" to incarcerate an 
offender on the basis of the traditional 
understanding of criminal responsibility 
may be partly appeased by the thought 
that the chief goal ol imprisonment is 
rehabilitation. Punishment is then viewed 
as aL least largely benign and responsive 
to the deterministic aspect of human life. 
This maintains the bifurcated regime of 
the criminal law but bririgs a needed 
peace of mind. 
On the very long view, we have grown 
increasingly aware of the fragility of our 
own autonomy and increasingly 
concerned that punishment conjoin a 
good deal of care for "~veakness" \v,t11 a 
substantial degree of deterrence and 
decreasing attention to retribution. But 
up close, the path of ideas about criminal 
justice lhas hardly been linear. It has 
been, rather, either subject to brief 
moments of atavism or downright 
cyclical. We are, as I write, at an 
especially tense moment - and a lengthy 
one at that: for several decades now, the 
ideal of rehabilitation has been under. 
significant pressure. To some extent we 
have responded to the observation that 
In truth, the rhetoric of determinism is now so pervasive 
that we cannot fully understand the role of the jury without 
recognizing that we sometimes ask that institution to 
resolve an issue on which we are deeply divided, not only 
between groups but also within ourselves. 
the indeterminate sentence does not 
work. Our calls for fixed sentences and 
our critique of rehabilitation are thus 
premised in part on the view that a 
return to older ways is fairer to those we 
hold responsible and even accords them 
a greater degree of human dignity. To 
some extent, too, we simply espress our 
anger, and our natural fears of crime. Not 
least, however, we seem increasingly 
captured by the notion that we have gone 
too far in the direction of absolving one 
another of personal responsibility. It 
seems entirely plausible that the due- 
process and equal-protection based 
arguments for fixed sentences and for 
guidelines that ensure that such 
sentences will not vary from judge to 
judge reflect a desire to strain out, to a 
large degree, consideration of 
background "causal" factors that "led" to 
the crimes for which the fixed and fair 
sentences are imposed. If so, theories of 
will once again come to the fore; the 
recrudescence of pre-Progressive-Era 
ideas trades on an endorsement of the 
dignity of the individual and attention to 
personal responsibility, so that the 
resulting approach to sanctions owes 
nothing - apparently - to a modem 
version of the theoly of incapacitation 
solely in the social defense. 
Within the legal world of bench, bar, 
and academy, as in society at large, the 
traditional and fundamentally unstable 
view prevails. Nor have the values 
associated with the traditional view 
altered: political liberty, human dignity, 
and freedom of the will remain 
intertwined. Perhaps Professor Kadish 
has put the matter as well and wisely 
as anyone: 
M L L C ~  O O L L ~  conznzitmelzt to denzocratic 
values, to human dignity and seljdeter- 
nzination, to the valtie of the individual, 
turns on the pivot of a view of man m a 
responsible agent entitled to be praised 01-  
blamed depending upon hisfree cl~oice of 
conduct. A view of nzelz "merely as alterable, 
predictable, curable or manipulatable 
things" is tlze fowzdation of a veql dyferent 
social order indeed. Tlze ancient izotiolz of 
free will may, in substn~ztial measure, be a 
nzyth. But even a convinced determinist 
slzould reject a govemnzental regime wlziclz is 
fou~zded on a~zytl~i?zg less iiz its system of 
autlzolitati~le disposition of citizens. 
LWzether tlze colzcept of lnan as responsible 
agent is fact or fancy is n vely dqferent 
questionfrom whetlzer sve ought to insist tlzat 
the goveinlnent iiz its coercive dealings ~vitlz 
individuals nzust act on that prenzise. 
[Sanford H. Kadish, "The Decline of 
Innocence," 26 Calnblidge Law Jo~unal  
273, 287 (1968) (quoting H.L.A. Hart, 
P~~?zislzmetzt and Responsibility, 182 
(1968).] 
If indeed we "ought to insist . . . ," 
we ought also to expect that tensions 
within the law, and within ourselves as 
we act out the law's imperatives, will be 
with us to the end. 
In the academy, to be sure, neo-realist 
analyses and critiques have exploded 
long-standing orthodoxy: the legal 
designations of "free" and "unfree," hence 
guilty or innocent under the criminal 
law, have been portrayed as conclusions 
determined by political, social, or 
psychological circumstances, much in the 
same way that findings of proximate 
cause, duty, or a meeting of the minds 
were portrayed by the realists three- 
quarters of a century ago. Moreover, the 
very distinction that legal scholars 
typically draw between free will and 
determinism has sometimes been derided 
as a false dichotomy between "denatured 
choices." The law, some seem to suggest, 
should instead look to the role of culture 
- to prevailing standards of behavior, 
and to the beliefs that surround behavior, 
and, especially, to the interaction of 
"self' and culture - in establishing 
appropriate guidelines for the attribution 
of criminal responsibility. It is not always 
easy to decipher the perspective on the 
freedom issue that accompanies this 
approach. One is tempted at times to 
think that, here, yet another form of 
determinism appears as one of the 
innumerable forms of compatibilisin that 
the mind has constructed in its 
determined search for a place to stand 
and to judge. However that may be, it is 
important to noLe that the new academic 
stances - neo-realist, critical-legal, or 
postmodern - remain largely theoretical 
accounts of the nature of law and of 
human behavior. Their application in 
practice might be evidenced at the 
margins as they come to influence the 
minds of some judges, lawyers, and 
penologists. But given their inevitable 
distance from our current politics, they 
are even more foreign to society at large 
than were the ideas of fin de sikcle 
criminal anthropologists and interwar 
realists, especially with regard to the core 
issue of personal responsibility - the 
assessment of criminal guilt. 
For the most part, as we well know, 
academic concern with the mysteries of 
human free will remains just that: 
academic. In our more public capacities, 
if not always in our teaching and 
theorizing in print, we mainly indulge 
the presumption that underpins the law. 
As a group, we may express more 
skepticism about free will than other 
elements of the legal caste, and so might, 
like some of our predecessors, endorse, 
inter alia, broader definitions of legal 
insanity, but - perhaps out of allegiance 
to the consciousness of human freedom 
- when we act in the real world we are, 
most of us, not so very far from society at 
large. Like Pound, we leave the working 
out of the most difficult problems to the 
future. We play a role defined for us by 
our culture and our psychology, as 
generations of legal academics have 
before us and as those that follow 
probably will as well. This is a particularly 
influential role. To be sure, it is only one 
of many guideposts for our culture at 
large, and, no doub~ ,  politicians and 
religious leaders, among many others, 
send signals that have grea~er impacL 
upon greater numbers, so far as the 
alfirmation of human freedom is 
concerned But as perceived guardians of 
 he rules and underlying theories of the 
law, we hold a special place. If we are a 
relatively small part of the legions whose 
destiny it is to reinforce faith in human 
freedom - political liberty as well as free 
will, I ought to add - the work of our 
particular cadre is nonetheless relatively 
significant. 
The current widespread obsession 
with personal responsibility, it should be 
noted, reflects a reaction not only against 
this century's increasingly deterministic 
rhetoric regarding the causes of criminal 
behavior, but also against what are taken 
to be the deterministic assumptions that 
pervade the welfare state generally. These 
assumptions reiate both to noncriminal 
and criminal concerns, as government 
initiatives affect existing concepts of just 
deserts in distributive justice, regarding, 
inter alia, property and contract, as well 
as in retributive justice, the traditional 
domain of the criminal law. Progressivism 
is carried forward, but it is also under 
profound attack across the spectrum of 
political and social thought. In this, our 
politics have produced a macrocosmic 
reflection of t'ne microcosmic experience 
within each of us. 
But who is "us"? Society as a whole is 
deeply divided between the heirs to 
Progressivism and those who have now 
rejected, or who never accepted, its 
message for criminal justice. Disagreements 
on responsibility not only track, in the 
large, religious, social and other 
alignments, but are also, ol  course, 
internal to  hose and other perspectives, 
including the recent movements along 
racial, ethnic, and gender lines. This is 
not the place for a rehearsal of the 
multifaceted role of the free-will- 
determinism issue in modern American 
society. Nor - even if it were - am I 
well suited to undertake such a taslz. 
I want only to say that the issue is still 
very much with us and that, with respect 
to criminal justice, we are more 
conflicted than ever. Conflicted to the 
point that our attitudes defy generalization. 
The main direction of our present 
thought and behavior depends entirely 
on the eye of the beholder. If we tend to 
speak with greater confidence about main 
directions in the past, that may well be 
due to the increased perspective that a 
historical view affords. Which is to say 
that we know very little about the past 
and too much about the present. 
About the inscrutable present we 
might nonetheless venture some final 
commentary along the lines marked out 
by our discussion of Speranza and 
Pound. Speranza was an American 
lawyer, but at the start of his career he 
looked at American law from the outside, 
with ties to, and an understanding of, the 
continental tradition, and with the 
sympathies of the scientist. Pound was 
well inside the common law tradition, 
albeit - early on - among its more 
progressive spirits and trenchant critics. 
Pound's brand of Progressivism propelled 
him to the forefront of the academy, but 
it also set limits to his worldview and to 
his understanding of the relationship of 
law to behavioral science. It engendered a 
certain confidence and even complacency 
as it focused his gaze on overall social 
functionalism rather than on specific 
human motivations. I have illustrated 
that tendency in Pound partly in terms of 
the evolution in his understanding of the 
role of the jury. In 1909 he saw ad hoc 
jury lawfinding as at least in part a 
useful and progressive antidote to the 
rigidity and old-fashionedness of the law; 
by 1920, he mainly saw it not only as 
anachronistic, but also as dysfunctional 
in a society that had, across the 
Progressive years, indulged in the 
rhetoric of rational decision-making and 
institutional coordination. 
From our own perspective, the 
opti~nism of the Progressive Era and of 
Pound's majestic account seems a mite 
naive. And the irreducible problem of 
human freedom thus looms all the larger. 
The story of the post-1930 period - as 
yet untold - has an ending with which 
we are familiar. O n  the most fundamental 
issue, that of human accountability, we 
have made little progress. This is 
reflected as much as anywhere in our 
own thinking about the jury, which is, to 
be sure, more complex than was Pound's. 
We are still to great extent history- 
bound, although for us history includes 
the rights revolution of the post- 
World-War-I1 era and the dramatic 
developments in participation on juries 
of women, and blacks, and of many 
ethnic groups that formerly were not 
represented. But our perspective on the 
jury is also characterized by our 
awareness of the impact, subconscious or 
otherwise, of some of the newest forms of 
"science" on those who seive. As a result, 
our instincts about what jurors may 
appropriately take into account reveal 
conflict about long-settled, formal 
divisions of power. In tmth, the rhetoric 
of determinism is now so pervasive that 
we cannot fully understand the role of 
the jury without recognizing that we 
sometimes ask that institution to resolve 
an issue on which we are deeply divided, 
not only between groups but also within 
ourselves. We alternately condone or 
condemn a particular jury that at least 
seems to have applied some notion of 
mitigated responsibility to which the law 
does not formally p i e  recognition. 
Sometimes we recognize how 
contradictory we are in this regard; 
sometimes we do not. 
In thinking about the relationship 
between the criminal trial juiy and the 
duality of our responses to those whose 
actions displease us - our tendencies to 
blame or to explain away -we ought to 
recall that the jury is both constrained by 
legal rules and a plaything of social 
forces. That relationship has, therefore, 
taken a variety of forms: At times the jury 
has been relatively resistant to expression 
of doubts about human freedom; at 
others it has allowed their expression 
fairly freely. Even when jurors or 
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members of society at large have 
expressed such doubts, they have usually 
done so in the spirit of recognizing in a 
particular case an exception to what they 
perceive in general as valid rules 
regarding responsibility. Thus, when the 
jury has gone outside the rule of law, it 
has often fortified the presumption of 
human freedom by providing a release 
point where otherwise that presumption 
might have been called into doubt. In 
this fashion, the jury has at times 
functioned as a legitimator at the trial 
stage, just as some substantive doctrines 
have done against the background of 
the unprovable premise that underlies 
our traditional theory of criminal 
responsibility. That has not necessarily 
been anyone's intention, any more than 
we are necessarily selfconscious about the 
manner in which we - in our private 
lives - shore up our own blaming 
instinct by giving way in particular 
instances where insistence upon blame 
might lead us to suspect, rightly or 
wrongly, that there is always something 
rationally indefensible about that 
insistence 
The legal constraints within which 
juries operate can, of course, be 
understood as reflections of the interests 
of authorities in husbanding the power to 
withhold or to grant release from the 
rules of criminal responsibility on their 
own terms. But that does not do full 
justice to the long history of the jury's 
power to find, or to nullify, the law. The 
English bench has at times encouraged 
juries to play that very role, at times 
sought to set distinct but far from total 
limits on that practice, and at times 
attempted to eliminate it altogether. On 
the American side, the story has been - 
and remains - equally complex. From 
yet another perspective, limitations upon 
the jury have often reflected attention to 
the rule ol law as a general matter and 
have been only incidentally related to, 
though they may have had significant 
impact upon, the tensions regarding 
responsibility that I have been discussing. 
Finally, jury nullification in cases 
involving the issue of human autonomy 
bears an important relationship to jury 
nullification in so-called political cases. 
In the latter, the jury is often in the 
position of affirming human freedom: 
even where the jury is mainly registering 
opposition to a particular law, the 
defendant who is thereby treated 
mercifully is sometimes thought to have 
challenged that law on the basis of deep 
moral beliefs, of his or her own free will. 
This is the tradition of jury latitude that 
was long the backbone of the jury law- 
finding doctrine and it remains central to 
the modem jury nullification debate. 
Social and legal recognition of the 
legitimacy of this form of jury behavior- 
or even mere toleration of its occasional 
manifestation - cannot help but fortify 
jury nullification where the jury 
disaffirms human freedom: most 
notoriously, in some cases where the 
defendant has raised a legal insanity 
defense, but also, more generally, in 
routine criminal cases, where juries have 
sometimes responded intuitively to what 
might be termed commonplace social 
constraints upon freedom of thought and 
action. There has never been, in the 
Anglo-American tradition, an effective 
separation between arguments for jury- 
based law-finding in these very different 
kinds of cases. The age old practice of 
freedom-disaffirmance, in its most 
general forms, has traded on the 
longstanding tradition of freedom- 
affirmance in cases raising the question of 
political liberty, and vice versa. 
I have, on another occasion, alluded to 
an important aspect of the relationship 
among the English criminal trial jury, law 
reform, and the problem of responsibility 
that we do well to keep in mind as we 
attempt to situate Pound in relation to 
our own time and place. The reform of 
sanctions in the early Victorian era may 
have been undertaken in part as a 
reaction to the tendency of jurors to give 
weight to the social conditions that 
produced crime as they searched for 
reasons to nullify the capital sanction for 
what they viewed as less than the most 
heinous of offenses. Here, the interests of 
political and legal authorities in 
maintaining the integrity of the orthodox 
theory of responsibility mixed with their 
interests in deterrence and in simple 
humanitarianism. The reform of 
sanctions then combined with ongoing 
property qualifications for jury service 
and with the development of a culture of 
deference to the bench to produce over 
time a self-restrained English criminal 
trial jury Some early-twentieth century 
American critics of the criminal trial jury, 
including Pound, drew lessons from the 
English experience and sought to make 
over the American trial in the image of its 
English counterpart. But not all such 
critics shared the same agenda. Among 
the common lawyers, Pound was, if not 
unique, something of an odd man out. 
Pound wrote about the sources of the 
extensive powers of the American jury at 
some length. For the most part, he 
situated the jury within the history of 
political liberty. With respect to human 
autonomy, he stressed, as we have seen, 
jury-based acceptance of the frontier 
urges of vindication of honor-the 
assertion of individual liberty-rather 
than jury-based recognition of the social 
and psychological constraints upon 
human freedom. Pound favored a more 
limited role for the jury, but not in order 
to shore up the orthodox common-law 
theory of criminal responsibility. Rather, 
he deemed jury-based law-finding 
dysfunctional precisely because, whether 
it was progressive or retrogressive, it was 
relative to a theory of responsibility that 
he thought irrational. Pound sought to 
husband for the bench the powers that 
the positivists sought to reserve for 
scientific experts, and like the positivists, 
he did so in the name of substituting a 
new theory of responsibility for the 
orthodox free-will-based theory of 
common law criminal jurisprudence. 
Pound's hopes for a true melding of 
law, science, and morals came to naught; 
even he could not squarely confront the 
implications of the sermon he preached. 
The positivist program relative to a new 
applied theory of criminal responsibility 
has largely collapsed. Orthodoxy has 
prevailed, albeit amidst the heightened 
tensions produced by the rhetoric 
regarding the causes of criminal behavior 
that the positivists boldly set in motion 
and the Progressives furthered in their 
own more tentative fashion. This is the 
situation in which modem American 
society, including the institution of the 
criminal trial jury, now finds itself. 
We are confronted daily with evidence 
that seems to confirm Pound's insistence 
upon a particular form of American 
exceptionalism (our "frontier attitude") 
regarding the intensity of our attraction 
to individual rights, the frequency of our 
recourse to violent self-help, and the 
depths ol our suspicion of the state. 
What Pound deemed an unhealthy, "held 
over" attachment to will theory probably 
strikes some as Americans' ongoing 
- - 
embrace of the deepest truth, others as 
recourse to a useful belief (conducive 
both to the preservation of political 
liberty and the cultivation of a sense of 
personal well-being), and still others as 
too great a rejection of what - like it or 
not - we already know about the nature 
of ourselves. Among even these last there 
may be some who nonetheless believe 
that an appropriate balance between the 
"religion" of free will and the "science" of 
determinism is struck in the rituals by 
which we now live. And among these 
rituals are the practical and symbolic 
aspects of jury-based determination of 
guilt - in some cases, of punishment- 
in accordance neither with pure legal 
abstraction nor with supposed scientific 
precept, but, as we are wont to say, with 
the "common sense" and the "conscience" 
of the community. 
Perhaps as testimony to this 
perspective, the phenomenon of 
bifurcation of the criminal process has 
developed increasing prominence. In 
capital cases, to take a leading, though 
admittedly exotic, example, the 
sentencing stage in most states is left in 
the hands of the jury, so that the same 
persons first assess guilt on the basis of 
the limiting terms of the law of evidence 
and then, if they convict of capital 
murder, sometimes reassess it (de facto) 
in the context of affixing punishment in 
light of information that, had it been 
before them at the trial stage, might have 
led them to a different result. The ad hoc 
aspect of lay decisionmaking has been 
harnessed to the process at sentencing - 
the potentially more "scientific" stage - 
a turn of events that would have appalled 
Pound even as it might have pleased the 
Speranza of 190 1. Decisions must not 
only be made, they must also be lived 
with. So, too, must incoherence be lived 
with, and - evidently - its lessons 
allowed to temper our judgment as we, 
case by case, see fit. Not only with 
respect to the marketplace wherein 
Professor Dawson traced the history of 
economic duress, but in the domain of 
criminal justice administration as well. 
Perhaps there more than anywhere. 
For it is one thing to observe academically 
that we can't prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was a free 
agent; it is another actually to have to 
pass judgment upon persons who society 
has agreed must be held responsible - 
indeed, who are said to have a right both 
with respect to human dignity and as 
against overweening political authority to 
be conceived of as personally responsible. 
The resulting tension can be very great, 
and the ritual of judgment is sometimes 
no less than an act of faith. One feels a 
certain truth - shall we say, a certain 
consolation? - in the observation that, 
after all (let Speranza's words be my last): 
"Law is one of the Humanities." 
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